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Abstract

A disproportionate number of the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent cases on freedom of religion come out of
Quebec and involve claims for reasonable accommodation. These decisions represent a point of national
cleavage in two respects. First, in each case the Quebec Court of Appeal rejected the section 2(a) claims, and
the Supreme Court of Canada overturned its decision. Second, the Supreme Court has often divided on
national lines with one or more francophone judges from Quebec writing a concurrence or a sharp dissent.
Moreover, francophone judges from outside Quebec have also broken ranks with their colleagues. The
cleavages on the Supreme Court have sometimes tracked a large and arguably growing divide between
Quebec and the rest of Canada on these questions. I link this line of cases to earlier disputes about the
constitutionality of Quebec’s policies to promote the French language that were ultimately resolved by the
Court. The fact that the Court spoke in a single voice in those earlier cases can be explained, in part, by the
need to preserve its institutional legitimacy. This time, the point of dispute is not language, but religion. The
Supreme Court is groping incrementally toward a kind of consensus position on the character of the “neutral”
state to close this divide within the Court against the backdrop of an intense political debate on these issues in
Quebec.
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Rights Adjudication in a Plurinational
State: the Supreme Court of Canada,
Freedom of Religion, and the Politics of
Reasonable Accommodation
SUJIT CHOUDHRY *
A disproportionate number of the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent cases on freedom of religion come out of Quebec and involve claims for reasonable accommodation. These decisions
represent a point of national cleavage in two respects. First, in each case the Quebec Court
of Appeal rejected the section 2(a) claims, and the Supreme Court of Canada overturned its
decision. Second, the Supreme Court has often divided on national lines with one or more francophone judges from Quebec writing a concurrence or a sharp dissent. Moreover, francophone
judges from outside Quebec have also broken ranks with their colleagues. The cleavages on the
Supreme Court have sometimes tracked a large and arguably growing divide between Quebec
and the rest of Canada on these questions. I link this line of cases to earlier disputes about
the constitutionality of Quebec’s policies to promote the French language that were ultimately
resolved by the Court. The fact that the Court spoke in a single voice in those earlier cases can
be explained, in part, by the need to preserve its institutional legitimacy. This time, the point
of dispute is not language, but religion. The Supreme Court is groping incrementally toward a
kind of consensus position on the character of the “neutral” state to close this divide within the
Court against the backdrop of an intense political debate on these issues in Quebec.
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part of the line of cases I focus on here.
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Un nombre disproportionné des causes récentes de la Cour suprême du Canada sur la liberté
de religion proviennent du Québec et font intervenir des demandes d’accommodements raisonnables. Ces décisions représentent à deux égards un point de clivage national. Premièrement,
dans toutes les causes, la Cour d’appel du Québec a rejeté les demandes en vertu de l’article
2a) et la Cour suprême du Canada a renversé cette décision. Deuxièmement, la Cour suprême
du Canada a souvent été divisée en raison de critères nationaux, alors qu’un ou plusieurs juges
francophones du Québec rédigeaient un assentiment ou une dissidence marquée. De plus,
des juges francophones de l’extérieur du Québec ont également rompu les rangs de leurs
collègues. Les clivages de la Cour suprême dénotent parfois une grande division et, comme on
pourrait en argumenter, une division croissante entre le Québec et le reste du Canada sur ces
questions. Je relie cet ensemble de causes à des disputes antérieures sur la constitutionnalité
des politiques du Québec visant à promouvoir la langue française, question qui a été résolue en
dernier ressort par la Cour. Lors de ces causes antérieures, le fait que la Cour se soit exprimée
à l’unisson peut s’expliquer en partie par le besoin de préserver sa légitimité institutionnelle.
Cette fois ci, le point en litige n’est pas la langue, mais plutôt la religion. La Cour suprême se
dirige à tâtons vers une position de plus en plus consensuelle sur le caractère « neutre » de
l’état pour clore cette division de la Cour sur la toile de fond d’un débat politique intense sur
ces questions au Québec.
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THE CHARTER’S1 GUARANTEE of freedom of religion has been both central and

peripheral to Canadian constitutional jurisprudence. On the one hand, two of
the earliest cases under the Charter arose under section 2(a)—Big M 2 and Edwards
Books.3 In addition to marking important occasions for the Supreme Court
of Canada to assert its power of judicial review over a politically controversial
legislative policy (Sunday closing laws), the Court used those judgments to set
out some of the basic framework of Charter adjudication, such as the purposive
approach to interpreting Charter guarantees4 and the idea that deference is
warranted under section 1 in some circumstances.5 But for many years section
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd [1985] 1 SCR 295, 18 DLR (4th) 321 [Big M].
R v Edwards Books and Art Ltd [1986] 2 SCR 713, 35 DLR (4th) 1 [Edwards Books].
Big M, supra note 2.
Edwards Books, supra note 3.
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2(a) lay fallow, generating few appeals that made their way to the Supreme Court.
Important doctrinal issues under section 2(a) remained unaddressed, and cases
concerning religious freedom could not contribute to the development of the
broader edifice of Charter doctrine—most notably, questions of evidence under
section 1 and constitutional remedies.
Over the past decade, this picture has changed dramatically. In Lafontaine,6
Reference re Same-Sex Marriage,7 Multani,8 Bruker,9 Hutterian Brethren,10 AC,11
and SL,12 the Court added considerable detail to the constitutional doctrine
surrounding section 2(a). The Court has now grappled with what constitutes a
religion, the elements for making out a successful section 2(a) claim, and the
requisite issues of evidence.13 The Court has also squarely addressed the question
of reasonable accommodation, adapting for the Charter an idea originally developed
under human rights codes14 while limiting its reach to individual decisions and
declining to extend it to laws of general application.15 In addition, some of these
cases were argued on the basis of both administrative law and Charter grounds

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérôme-Lafontaine v Lafontaine (Village), 2004 SCC
48, 2 SCR 650 [Lafontaine cited to SCC].
Same-Sex Marriage, Re, 2004 SCC 79, 3 SCR 698 [Reference re Same-Sex Marriage].
Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 2006 SCC 6, 1 SCR 256 [Multani cited
to SCC].
Bruker v Marcovitz, 2007 SCC 54, 3 SCR 607 [Bruker cited to SCC].
Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, 2 SCR 567 [Hutterian
Brethren].
Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services) v C(A), 2009 SCC 30, 2 SCR 181 [AC].
SL v Commission scolaire des Chênes, 2012 SCC 7, 1 SCR 235 [SL cited to SCC].
Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, 2004 SCC 47, 2 SCR 551 [Amselem cited to SCC]; Multani,
supra note 8; Bruker, supra note 9; Hutterian Brethren, supra note 10; and SL, supra note 12.
Multani, supra note 8.
Hutterian Brethren, supra note 10. Note that Hutterian Brethren contradicts Reference re
Same-Sex Marriage and Edwards Books on this point. In those earlier judgments, the Court
held that the presence of a religious exemption to facially neutral rules—a form of reasonable
accommodation—rendered the laws constitutional under the minimal impairment branch of
the Oakes test. The logical corollary of this proposition is that the lack of such an exemption/
accommodation would have rendered these laws unconstitutional. So the real question in
Hutterian Brethren was not whether legislation can be found unconstitutional for failure
to make a reasonable accommodation. Rather, the issue is the appropriate constitutional
remedy in these cases: a constitutional exemption for the claimant under s 24(1) of the
Charter, the reading-in of an exemption under s 52(1) of the Charter, or a declaration of
invalidity (perhaps suspended) permitting the legislature to amend the law to provide for an
exemption.
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(Chamberlain,16 Trinity Western,17 Lafontaine, and Multani), with the Court
opting for the former as the basis for its decision18 and in the process producing a
Charter-inflected administrative law. The Court has also been required to grapple
with the vexing problem of the conflict between religious freedom and the right
to equality, especially in the context of sexual orientation.19 There is a large and
interesting critical literature on the jurisprudence, which discusses not only the
wide range of doctrinal issues raised, but also the broader political disputes out of
which the cases have arisen.20
16. Chamberlain v Surrey School District No 36, 2002 SCC 86, 4 SCR 710 [Chamberlain].
17. Trinity Western University v College of Teachers (British Columbia), 2001 SCC 31, 1 SCR 772
[Trinity Western].
18. The Court was sometimes divided on this point: Lafontaine, supra note 6; Multani, supra
note 8.
19. Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 7; Chamberlain, supra note 16; and Trinity
Western, supra note 17.
20. Benjamin L Berger, “Key Theoretical Issues in the Interaction of Law and Religion: A Guide
for the Perplexed” (2011) 19:2 Const Forum Const 41; Benjamin L Berger, “The Abiding
Presence of Conscience: Criminal Justice Against the Law and the Modern Constitutional
Imagination” (2011) 61:4 UTLJ 579; José Woehrling, “Quand la Cour suprême s’applique
à restreindre la portée de la liberté de religion: l’arrêt Alberta c. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson
Colony (2009)” (2011) 45:1 RJT 7; Sara Weinrib, “An Exemption for Sincere Believers:
The Challenge of Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony” (2011) 56:3 McGill LJ
719; Howard Kislowicz, Richard Haigh & Adrienne Ng, “Calculations of Conscience:
The Costs and Benefits of Religious and Conscientious Freedom” (2010-2011) 48:3
Alta L Rev 679; Luc Tremblay, “The Bouchard-Taylor Report on Cultural and Religious
Accommodation: Multiculturalism by Any Other Name?” (2010-2011) 15:1 Rev Const
Stud 35; Benjamin L Berger, “Section 1, Constitutional Reasoning and Cultural Difference:
Assessing the Impacts of Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony” (2010) 51 Sup Ct
L Rev (2d) 25; Louis-Philippe Lampron, “Pour que la Tempête ne s’étende jamais hors du
verre d’eau: réflexions sur la protection des convictions religieuses au Canada” (2010) 55:4
McGill LJ 743; Nathalie Des Rosiers, “Freedom of Religion at the Supreme Court in 2009:
Multiculturalism at the Crossroads?” (2010) 51 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 73; Robert E Charney,
“How Can There Be Any Sin in Sincere? State Inquiries into Sincerity of Religious Belief ”
(2010) 51 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 47; Richard Moon, “Accommodation Without Compromise:
Comment on Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony” (2010) 51 Sup Ct L Rev (2d)
95; Sara Weinrib, “The Emergence of the Third Step of the Oakes Test in Alberta v. Hutterian
Brethren of Wilson Colony” (2010) 68:2 UT Fac L Rev 77; FC DeCoste, “Caesar’s Faith:
Limited Government and Freedom of Religion in Bruker v. Marcovitz” (2009) 32:1 Dal LJ
153; Margaret H Ogilvie, “Bruker v. Marcovitz: (Get)ting Over Freedoms (Like Contract
and Religion) in Canada” (2009) 24:2 NJCL 173; Mahmud Jamal, “Recent Developments
in Freedom of Religion” (2009) 27 NJCL 253; Benjamin L Berger, “The Cultural Limits
of Legal Tolerance” (2008) 21:2 Can JL & Jur 245; Benjamin L Berger, “Moral Judgment,
Criminal Law and the Constitutional Protection of Religion” (2008) 40 Sup Ct L Rev (2d)
513; Louise Langevin et al, “L’affaire Bruker c. Marcovitz: variations sur un thème” (2008)
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I want to come at this body of case law from a different angle. One of the
most striking features of the Court’s recent jurisprudence on section 2(a) is that
a disproportionate number of cases come out of Quebec21 and, indeed, were
adjudicated under the Quebec Charter:22 Amselem, Lafontaine, Multani, Bruker
and SL. I will suggest that these cases all involve claims for reasonable accommodation. Moreover, as Sébastien Grammond has acutely observed, these decisions
represent a point of national cleavage in two respects.23 First, in each case the
Quebec Court of Appeal rejected the section 2(a) claim, and the Supreme Court
of Canada overturned its decision. Second, these national divisions are arguably
present on the Supreme Court itself. The Court has often divided on national
lines, with one or more francophone judges from Quebec either writing a
concurrence (Justice LeBel in Lafontaine) or a sharp dissent (Justice Deschamps
in Bruker). Moreover, francophone judges from outside Quebec have also broken
ranks with their colleagues through dissents (Justice Bastarache in Amselem) and
concurrences (Justice Charron in Multani). Though the Court often divides, it
does so exceedingly rarely along these lines. The plurinational dimension of the
Court’s recent section 2(a) case law is brought into even sharper relief when it is
juxtaposed with the intense and contemporaneous debate within Quebec over
49:4 Les Cahiers de Droit 655; Benjamin L Berger, “Law’s Religion: Rendering Culture”
(2007) 45:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 277; José Woehrling, “La place de la religion dans les écoles
publiques du Québec” (2007) 41:3 RJT 651; Pierre Bosset & Pail Eid, “Droit et religion: de
l’accommodement raisonnable à un dialogue internormatif?” (2007) 41:2 RJT 513; Kathryn
Bromley Chan, “The Duelling Narratives of Religious Freedom: A Comment on Syndicat
Northcrest v. Amselem” (2005-2006) 43:2 Alta L Rev 451; Bruce Ryder, “State Neutrality and
Freedom of Conscience and Religion” (2005) 29 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 169; David M Brown,
“Neutrality or Privilege? A Comment on Religious Freedom” (2005) 29 Sup Ct L Rev (2d)
221; Richard Moon, “Religious Commitment and Identity: Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem”
(2005) 29 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 201; Richard Moon, “Sexual Orientation Equality and
Religious Freedom in the Public Schools: A Comment on Trinity Western University v. B.C.
College of Teachers and Chamberlain v. Surrey School Board District 36” (2003) 8:2 Rev Const
Stud 228; Richard Moon, “Liberty, Neutrality, and Inclusion: Religious Freedom Under
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (2003) 41:1 Brandeis LJ 563; Benjamin
L Berger, “The Limits of Belief: Freedom of Religion, Secularism, and the Liberal State”
(2002) 17 CJLS 39; Richard Moon, ed, Law and Religious Pluralism in Canada (Vancouver:
UBC Press, 2008); Howard Adelman & Pierre Anctil, eds, Religion, Culture, and the State:
Reflections on the Bouchard-Taylor Report (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011);
Sébastien Grammond, “Conceptions canadienne et québécoise des droits fondamentaux et
de la religion: convergence or conflit?” (2009) 43:1 RJT 83.
21. Lafontaine, supra note 6; Multani, supra note 8; Bruker, supra note 9; SL, supra note 12; and
Amselem, supra note 13.
22. Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, RSQ, c C-12 [Quebec Charter].
23. Grammond, supra note 20.
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the accommodation of religious minorities, in which the Court’s decisions—
especially Multani—are a central part. These debates have highlighted a large and
arguably growing divide between Quebec and the rest of Canada (RoC) with
respect to the strong claims for neutrality and secular democracy advanced by
Quebec’s francophone political elites. The cleavages on the Supreme Court have
sometimes tracked these larger political divides.
In this article, I address the plurinational dimension of the Supreme Court’s
recent religious freedom cases by focusing on divisions within the Court itself.
I link this line of case law to an earlier episode of Canadian constitutional politics
when the Charter, as the instrument of pan-Canadian nation building, was
used to intervene in our seemingly endless debates over national unity. This was
evident through a series of legal disputes under the Charter regarding the
constitutionality of Quebec’s policies to promote the French language, which
were ultimately resolved by the Court. What we may now be witnessing is a new
chapter in the complex story of Quebec, Canada, and the Charter. This time,
however, the point of dispute is not language, but religion. The Quebec cases,
as a group, have brought this issue before the Court. I think the Supreme Court is
aware of this broader political context and is groping incrementally towards a kind of
consensus position on the character of the “neutral” state in order to close this divide
against the backdrop of an intense political debate on these issues in Quebec.

I. LINGUISTIC NATION BUILDING, THE CHARTER, AND THE
SUPREME COURT
Let me provide some intellectual and political context for my argument by
revisiting the history of Quebec’s language policies, the Charter, and the Supreme
Court. There is a familiar story here: The Charter was adopted as an instrument
of pan-Canadian nation building to compete with the centrifugal effects of
Quebec nationalism.24 Until the 1960s, Quebec’s constitutional claims had been
defensive, aimed at safeguarding its existing areas of jurisdiction. In the 1960s,
Quebec’s goals shifted to ethno-national linguistic nation building and expansion
of its jurisdiction over social and economic policy. The basic political objective
of the Charter was to combat Quebec nationalism by regulating linguistic nation
building in Quebec and by constituting a pan-Canadian political community.
24. See Sujit Choudhry, “Bills of Rights as Instruments of Nation Building in Multinational
States: The Canadian Charter and Quebec Nationalism” in James B Kelly & Christopher P
Manfredi, eds, Contested Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009) 233.
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In regulative terms, the Charter imposes legal restraints on minority nation
building by entrenching rights to interprovincial mobility and to minority language
education. Both rights can be understood as a response to potential or actual
policies of linguistic nation building within Quebec. Indeed, Quebec objected
to both protections precisely on that basis. In addition, the Charter was intended
to function constitutively as the germ of a common Canadian nationalism. In a
federal state such as Canada, where citizens share Charter rights irrespective of
language or province of residence, the Charter serves as a transcendent form of
political identification—the spine of common citizenship that unites members of
a linguistically diverse and geographically dispersed polity.
The clash between the Charter and Quebec’s nation-building policies generated three important cases before the Supreme Court.25 In all three cases, the
Court found these policies to be unconstitutional. In Ford v Quebec (Attorney
General),26 the Court struck down a provision in Quebec’s Charter of the French
Language 27 that required outdoor commercial signage to be exclusively in French.
According to the Court, the law was disproportionate to the objective of ensuring
that Quebec’s “visage linguistique” be French. Instead, a measure requiring that
French be predominant would have sufficed. There were also two important cases
regarding minority language education. A flashpoint during the adoption of the
Charter was the “Canada Clause,” which grants citizens educated in English at
the primary level anywhere in Canada the right to have their children educated
in English in Quebec.28 This right was specifically directed at a provision in
Quebec’s Charter of the French Language that required those individuals to educate
their children in French in order to promote the linguistic integration of interprovincial migrants to Quebec in the same way that international migrants were
encouraged to integrate. This provision was struck down by the Court in one
of its earliest decisions under the Charter: Quebec Protestant School Board.29 The
Charter also grants children who have received schooling in English anywhere
else in the country the right to continue schooling in English in Quebec. In
Solski (Tutor of ) v Quebec (Attorney General),30 the Court rejected an attempt to
25. See Sujit Choudhry & Richard Stacey, “Independent or Dependent? Constitutional Courts
in Divided Societies” in Colin Harvey & Alex Schwartz, eds, Rights in Divided Societies
(Oxford: Hart, 2012) 87 at 104-112.
26. [1988] 2 SCR 712, 54 DLR (4th) 577 [Ford].
27. RSQ, c C-11.
28. Charter, supra note 1, s 23.
29. Quebec Assn of Protestant School Boards v Quebec (Attorney General) (No 2), [1984] 2 SCR 66,
10 DLR (4th) 321 [Quebec Protestant School Board].
30. 2005 SCC 14, 1 SCR 201 [Solski].
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construe this right narrowly and read down the challenged provision to comply
with the Charter.
There are three noteworthy features of these decisions. First, in all three
cases, Quebec lost, and the Charter did indeed serve to constrain Quebec’s ability
to establish French as the common language of political, economic, and social life
in that province. Second, while the Court applied the Charter to limit Quebec’s
linguistic nation-building policies, it nonetheless accepted that the purpose
underlying these policies met the legitimate objective test. The constitutional
defect in the laws was that, as framed or construed by the government, they failed
at the minimal impairment stage of the proportionality analysis. Third, the judgments were unanimous and were handed down by “The Court” as an institution
rather than by an individual judge with whom the rest of the Court concurred.
Collective authorship by the entire Court is rare and indicates the greatest
possible degree of consensus among the justices.
These pieces all fit together. Their significance becomes clear if one recalls
that the Court is a regionally representative body, with three of nine judges
coming from Quebec, three from Ontario, and one from British Columbia, the
Prairies, and Atlantic Canada, respectively. However, Quebec’s representation is
special, as is reflected by the fact that it is the only province whose representation
has always been legally guaranteed. When the Court’s membership was enlarged
to nine in 1949, the Supreme Court Act was amended to require that three of the
judges be from Quebec.31 Later, the Constitution Act, 1982 entrenched Quebec’s
representation on the Court by requiring that changes thereto be made by unanimous
federal and provincial consent.32 By contrast, the regional distribution of the
remaining seats is a matter of constitutional convention and is not provided by a
statute or constitutional provision. An important justification for the special rules
governing Quebec’s representation on the Court is that the Supreme Court takes
civil law appeals from Quebec and therefore requires judges with the requisite
expertise. But the deeper rationale is that the composition of the Court reflects
and institutionalizes the plurinational character of Canada. Quebec is a constituent
nation in Canada’s plurinational federation, with boundaries drawn to create a
permanent francophone majority and with jurisdiction to adopt public policies
that protect French as the common public language of economic, political, and
social life in that province. Quebec’s national status entitles it to a guaranteed
minimum level of representation in a federal institution—such as the Supreme
Court—that makes important decisions delimiting the scope of Quebec’s power
31. Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, s 6.
32. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 41.
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to pursue such policies. A Court that ruled on these issues without judges from
Quebec would be widely perceived as constitutionally illegitimate within that
province.33
This much is well known. But far less thought has been given to the interesting
question of how the plurinational character of the Court’s membership is supposed
to play out in adjudication, especially with respect to cases arising out of Quebec.
As a technical matter, the Quebec judges enjoy no special powers relative to other
judges, either individually or collectively. But with regard to cases of special interest
to Quebec—for example, those that concern the power of Quebec to engage in
linguistic nation building—as a matter of constitutional practice, the Quebec
judges might play a different institutional role in the Court’s decision making.
Consider the following counter-factual scenario: Imagine that in Ford, Quebec
Protestant School Board, and Solski, the Court had divided on national lines. The
Quebec judges voted to uphold the policies under challenge, perhaps finding that
while there had been a breach of a Charter right, the breach was justified under
section 1. A majority of the Court, however, struck them down. Moreover, imagine
that the majority went further than holding that the measures were disproportionate, as the Court actually did. Rather, it held that the objective of preserving
and enhancing the status of French as Quebec’s common language was per se
illegitimate, because the language laws in question sought to redistribute
economic and political power away from Anglophones toward Francophones and
were therefore discriminatory. Moreover, when it rendered judgment in those
appeals, the Quebec justices were all francophone and the justices from the rest
of Canada were all anglophone, so that the division on the Court in this
hypothetical scenario would not only have pitted Quebec against the RoC
justices, but also francophone versus anglophone justices. Under this hypothetical
scenario, the disagreement on the Court would have been basic and fundamental,
and it would have been plurinational in character.
If this had happened, the dissent by the Quebec judges would have been
more than the routine disagreement that occurs on multi-member courts in the
common law world, including the Supreme Court of Canada. Given the
political origins of the Charter and the singular importance of the challenged
laws to modern Quebec nationalism, a Court divided on national lines would
have served to undermine the legitimacy of the Charter, and perhaps even the
33. See Sujit Choudhry, “Not a New Constitutional Court: The Canadian Charter, the Supreme
Court and Quebec Nationalism” in Pasquale Pasquino & Francesca Billi, eds, The Political
Origins of Constitutional Courts: Italy, Germany, France, Poland, Canada, United Kingdom
(Rome: Adriano Olivetti Foundation, 2009) 39 at 53-66.
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Court itself, within Quebec. This would have been a disaster. The decision to
speak unanimously as a single institution indicates an awareness that, with
respect to these divisive issues, it was important to present a collective front
that transcended the national divide built into the Court’s design. The Court’s
choice emphasized the fact that what drove the judgment was not the national
origin of the individual judge authoring the opinion, but the Court’s collective
understanding of the Charter and its relationship to the project of Quebec
nationalism. Framing its holding in this way protected both the legitimacy of
the Charter and the Court itself. Moreover, in these three cases, the judgments
occupied an intermediate position between polar extremes. The Court struck
down the provisions under challenge, but left space for Quebec to pursue those
policies by accepting Quebec’s objectives as constitutionally legitimate.34 Thus,
the constitutional flaw was framed as the proportionality of the response, not the
very idea of the policy itself.
We now come back to the question of how Quebec’s representation on the
Court affects how the Court resolves cases. What role did the Quebec judges
play in the Court’s internal deliberations on the Quebec language cases? We do
not, and may never, really know. There are two conceptual possibilities, which
we can term the bargaining and the deliberative accounts. On the bargaining
account, the Quebec judges had political leverage because of the political
costs of a dissenting judgment to the Charter and the Court. Their leverage was
insufficient to save Quebec’s legislation, but it was enough to shape the manner
in which it was struck down. As the price for a unanimous judgment, the Quebec
judges were able to negotiate the acceptance of the legality of Quebec’s legislative
objective, thereby allowing Quebec to enact a more narrowly-tailored policy that
would pursue the same goal and survive a subsequent constitutional challenge.
But this is too simplistic a picture of how judges interact on a multi-member
court, especially when they work within an institution governed by a highly
specialized, technical, and professional discourse that renders inadmissible such
crude political horse-trading. The deliberative account offers an alternative
explanation. What the Quebec judges brought to these cases was an alertness
to, and an understanding of, the roots of modern Quebec nationalism. To a
34. The Quebec Protestant School Board is ambiguous on this point and can be read either
to impliedly suggest that the objective of preserving and enhancing the status of French
as Quebec’s common language was per se illegitimate or that the means chosen were
disproportionate. Of important context is that the judgment is an early, pre-Oakes
decision, handed down before the Court determined the doctrinal framework for s 1.
As a consequence, the judgment must be interpreted through the lens of the subsequent
development in the jurisprudence.
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considerable extent, this nationalism arose as a defensive response to Ottawa’s
dramatically increased role in economic and social policies after the Second
World War. Federal policy activism meant an increase in the importance of
federal institutions, especially the federal bureaucracy, which worked in English
and in which francophone Quebeckers were a small minority. Another factor
was enormous social change within Quebec. After the war, Quebec underwent
massive urbanization and industrialization, and Anglophones dominated many
professions, including positions of economic leadership. These demographic and
economic shifts underscored and reinforced the role of language as the basis for
the unequal distribution of economic power within the province. Quebec
responded by mobilizing Francophones around linguistic nation building, which
encompassed the construction of a set of economic and political institutions to
ensure the survival of a modern, francophone society. The Quebec judges on
the Supreme Court, as members of Quebec’s elite who had lived through these
transformations and were indeed products of them, brought to the conference
table an understanding of both the origins and importance of these policies and
were therefore able to persuade their colleagues from outside the province of their
constitutional legitimacy. This led the Court to hold that the legislative objectives were justified under section 1, although the means chosen did not pass
constitutional muster.

II. THE QUEBEC RELIGION CASES AND THE DUTY TO
ACCOMMODATE
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION

It is against this intellectual and political backdrop that we should read the
Supreme Court’s recent religion cases that originated in Quebec. As we shall
see, reasonable accommodation is at the root of Amselem, Lafontaine, Multani,
Bruker, and SL, even if these cases were not brought or analyzed in that way.
The duty to accommodate was originally developed in the jurisprudence under
human rights codes. It arose in the employment context, in cases involving
adverse effects discrimination arising from the unequal impact of a facially-neutral
policy or rule on groups identified by a prohibited ground of discrimination.
Under human rights codes, employers could defend such policies as bona fide
occupational requirements if they met a test of proportionality.35 The Supreme
35. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v Simpsons-Sears Ltd, [1985] 2 SCR 536, 52 OR (2d)
799.
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Court took the view that a facially-neutral rule would fail this test if it could be
modified in its application to the affected group—for example, by granting an
exemption. This duty to accommodate was, however, subject to a requirement
that it not impose undue hardship on the employer. Determining what constitutes
undue hardship is a fact-specific inquiry that includes consideration of the rights
of other employees, the costs of accommodation, and the interests served by
the impugned policy (e.g., safety). In principle, the duty to accommodate
applies to all grounds of discrimination—for example, disability, sex, age, and
of course, religion.
The duty to accommodate was incorporated into the Charter in a number of
stages. Initially, in Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General),36 the Supreme
Court held in a section 15 challenge that the duty to accommodate was part of
the minimal impairment analysis under the Oakes test.37 Although Eldridge was
a case involving discrimination on the basis of disability, the analysis extended in
principle to all prohibited grounds of discrimination under section 15, including
religion. Some section 15 claims that allege discrimination on the basis of
religion, however, can also be framed as infringements of section 2(a) if interference with religious conduct is at stake. It was only a matter of time, therefore,
before reasonable accommodation arguments were made under section 2(a)—as
first occurred in Amselem.
The decisions in Amselem, Lafontaine, Multani, Bruker, and SL were handed
down during a period of intense debate within Quebec over claims by members
of minority religious communities (e.g., Jews, Muslims, and Sikhs). The claims
sought modification of existing institutions, practices, and rules on the ground
that they discriminated against these communities on the basis of religion. In
political discourse, these claims were lumped together as claims for accommodation. As the Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related
to Cultural Differences (the Bouchard-Taylor Commission)38 noted, such claims
are nothing new in Quebec. However, they reached a new level of intensity between
March 2006 and May 2007, sparked by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Multani. Indeed, they became campaign issues during the 2008 and 2012 elections.
The need for any governing party in Quebec to have significant support from
some segment of the nationalist electorate has led the major political parties to
formulate policies in response. While in government in 2010, the Liberal Party
36. [1997] 3 SCR 624, 151 DLR (4th) 577 [Eldridge].
37. R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, 26 DLR (4th) 200.
38. Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation (Quebec: Government of Quebec, 2008)
[Bouchard-Taylor Report].
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introduced Bill 94,39 which would have prohibited civil servants and anyone
doing business with the government (including those receiving services) from
wearing any religious garment that covers the face. The Parti Quebecois, which
recently won the largest number of seats in the 2012 provincial election,
campaigned on the promise to introduce a Charter of Secularism that would ban
public employees from wearing “overt” religious symbols.40
Political debates on accommodation became so heated that they prompted
the creation of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission with the short-term goal of
temporarily removing this issue from the public policy agenda for the 2008 election.
It is fair to say that accommodation has emerged as a new dimension in the
politics of collective identity in Quebec, adding questions about secular democracy to
longstanding concerns about language policy. Upon closer examination, however,
there was considerable variation in the kinds of religious practices that gave rise
to these claims, the precise character of the accommodation sought, the types
of parties against whom such claims were made, and the institutional contexts
within which the claims were made. For example, while most of the accommodations at issue were sought in government institutions (e.g., public schools),
some arose in the broader public sector (e.g., hospitals), and yet others in clearly
private contexts (e.g., private schools and condominiums) by individuals whose
relationships with those organizations were governed by contract. In addition,
the spheres within which those institutions operated—health care, education,
political participation, housing, and sports—varied as well. A wide range of
institutional policies were placed at issue concerning diet (e.g., in hospitals),
dress codes (e.g., in public employment), the delivery of health services, and
voting procedures. Finally, the accommodations sought varied, taking the form
of exemptions (e.g., to permit the wearing of a kirpan at schools), new public
programs (e.g., to provide for female physicians at a patient’s request), subsidies
to private entities (e.g., to private religious schools), and reallocation of existing
physical space (e.g., to create prayer rooms in public universities). Indeed, some
of the claims by religious minorities were not for accommodation of their
religious practices at all; rather, they argued that public institutions should be
prohibited from engaging in practices that endorsed the majority faith (e.g., the
practice of reciting a Christian prayer at municipal council meetings).41
39. An Act to establish guidelines governing accommodation requests within the Administration and
certain institutions, 1st Sess, 39th Leg, Quebec, 2010.
40. Parti Quebecois, “L’avenir du Québec est entre vos mains : la plateforme électorale du
Parti Québécois” (4 August 2012), online: <http://pq.org/actualite/communiques/
lavenir_du_quebec_est_entre_vos_mains_consultez_notre_plateforme_electorale>.
41. Bouchard-Taylor Report, supra note 38.
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As we shall see, the case law focuses on a much narrower cluster of situations
that clearly raise the duty to accommodate in its narrower, legal sense. The gap
between political discourse and legal argument raises the question of whether it
is illuminating to read the Supreme Court’s decisions in their broader political
context, given the lack of precision with which the term accommodation is used.
But it would be deeply artificial to push the broader political context away for
two reasons.
First, on questions of accommodation, there is an intimate connection
between law and politics. Some of the most politically controversial examples of
accommodation were brought in legal proceedings on the basis of the Quebec Charter
and the Charter. As the Bouchard-Taylor Report noted, religious minorities are
not seeking to act illegally; rather, they are advancing their claims by asserting
constitutional and statutory rights in administrative tribunals and courts. The
debate over accommodation is not just about the particular claims advanced. It
is also about the legal instruments that are the basis of these claims, and about
the proposals to change the legal status quo and thereby overrule the courts. For
example, the Parti Quebecois’ proposed Charter of Secularism would amend the
Quebec Charter to eliminate the duty to accommodate in certain circumstances
where it had previously been judicially recognized. It is vital that we offer a fair
account of the jurisprudence to inform those broader debates.
Second, the Supreme Court itself has been drawn into the politics of accommodation within Quebec. This was especially the case in Multani, which held that a
Sikh boy had the right to wear a kirpan to school under strict conditions. The Court
was sharply attacked for placing religious freedom above the safety of schools, and
for lacking common sense. Indeed, Multani was probably the single most important
reason for the establishment of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission. Moreover, there
is no sharp divide between the concepts, distinctions, and frameworks employed in
the political discourse and judicial decision making. In addition, the Court is likely
aware of the broader political context surrounding its judgments, and it is plausible
to read the trajectory of its jurisprudence—from division to tentative consensus—
as an attempt to speak in a single institutional voice in order to protect its own
legitimacy and that of the Charter.
There is another dimension to the politics of accommodation in Quebec
that buttresses the last point. By no means are the issues raised by claims for
accommodation confined to Quebec. Across Canada, there are questions about
the legitimate scope of accommodation—that is, what accommodations for
religious practices count as reasonable? We only need to look at Ontario, where
the furor over the use of shari’a law to govern property division and spousal
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support for Muslim couples through marriage contracts prompted a legislative
ban on this practice.42 But one of the most striking features of the politics
of accommodation is an increasing gulf between public attitudes in Quebec
and those in the RoC. Revealing evidence comes from a public opinion poll in
2007,43 at the height of the accommodation controversy. On a range of particular examples, respondents in the RoC were much more willing to accept claims
for accommodation than Quebeckers, for example permitting Muslim women
who wear hijabs to teach in public schools (75% in the RoC versus 48% in
Quebec), permitting Muslim girls to wear hijabs in public schools (70% in the
RoC versus 43% in Quebec), permitting Jewish physicians to wear yarmulkes in
hospitals (75% in the RoC versus 47% in Quebec), and permitting prayer facilities
in colleges or universities (66% in the RoC versus 33% in Quebec).44 The
Bouchard-Taylor Report cited other poll findings that reached the same conclusion.45
These findings are buttressed by anecdotal evidence: In no other province are
questions of accommodation as intense or as central to provincial politics,
especially during provincial election campaigns. Indeed, nothing approaching
Bill 94 and the Quebec Charter of Secularism has been proposed by any major
political party in the RoC.
In short, questions of accommodation have become a point of cleavage
between Quebec and the RoC. The roots of the particular salience of secularism
in Quebec lie in the origins of modern Quebec nationalism. A central element
of Quebec’s Quiet Revolution was rejection of the institutionalized role of the
Roman Catholic Church in the delivery of health care, education, and social
services, and of its related role as the arbiter of public morality in the service of
conservative values. The replacement of the Church in these realms by newly
created state institutions, coupled with a liberal social morality free from the
strictures of the Church, marked the foundation of modern Quebec. To be sure,
this kind of institutional transformation was not unique to Quebec; a parallel
process occurred in the other provinces. But the rejection of the institutional role
of the Church in Quebec was a central element of nationalist mobilization in the
1950s. Indeed, it can be said that modern Quebec nationalism is as much about
secular nation building as it was about linguistic nation building.

42. Family Statute Law Amendment Act, 2006, SO 2006, c C-1.
43. Jack Jedwab, “Reasonable Accommodation of Immigrants and Religious Minorities and the
Quebec Distinction” (2007), online: Association for Canadian Studies, <http://www.acs-aec.
ca/pdf/polls/11932375929163.pdf>.
44. Ibid at 2.
45. Ibid at 66.
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What this means is that the politics of accommodation assumes an additional dimension in Quebec. Along with language policy, it has become part of the
politics of plurinationalism. The jurisprudence on accommodation is thus a new
element of a larger debate over the relationship between the Charter, the Supreme
Court, and Quebec nationalism. At the advent of the Charter, this could not have
been foreseen. So, we must assess the roles of the Court and the Charter as centralizing checks not only on linguistic nation building, but also on secular nation
building. The same institutional issues arise for the Court as in language cases. If
the Court were to persistently divide along national lines in its religion cases, this
would pose challenges to the legitimacy of the Charter and the Supreme Court
within Quebec. As we shall see, the pattern on the Court is not so neat. Instead of
the Quebec judges penning concurrences or dissents as a bloc, there is a pattern
in which some of the francophone judges from within and outside Quebec part
company with their colleagues. But as Grammond argues, they appear to share
a distinct “Quebecois” approach to these issues, which might be a product of
sharing the same legal, professional, educational, and cultural milieu.46 The fact
that the case law manifested such divisions, particularly against the backdrop of
ongoing public controversy in Quebec, is politically salient and creates the pressure for consensus on the Court.
B. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND SECTION 2(A)

The decisions on reasonable accommodation were handed down while Canada’s
constitutional jurisprudence on freedom of religion was very much a work in
progress. In the liberal constitutional tradition, the stance of states toward
religion combines an attitude of non-endorsement and non-interference.
Non-endorsement means that the state has no official religion, but instead has a
secular identity that renders it neutral among contending faiths. Non-interference
means that individuals have the unfettered right to choose their religious affiliation,
or to reject it entirely, within a legal framework that guarantees that these choices
are free from force or fraud.
The Court’s early jurisprudence on the Charter began to incorporate these
ideas into Canadian constitutional law. Section 2(a) of the Charter guarantees
“freedom of conscience and religion,” which is clearly a constitutional guarantee
of non-interference. Thus, in Big M the Court held that section 2(a) entrenches
freedom to and freedom from religion, and it built both freedoms around
the notion of state coercion. This section guarantees the right to hold religious

46. Grammond, supra note 20 at 90.
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beliefs, to communicate them publicly, and to act upon them. It also protects
individuals from coercive measures that interfere with those activities. The Court
in Big M also held that section 2(a) protects individuals against coerced religious
affiliation, declaration, and conduct. However, the status of non-endorsement was
much weaker in these earlier cases. Indeed, the early Charter cases did not adopt such
a doctrine, in part because of the absence of an obvious textual hook to do so—for
example, the Charter has no analog to the American anti-establishment clause.47
To be sure, some of the same work can be done by a suitably expansive
doctrine of non-interference. For example, compelled religious observance can
be condemned not only on the basis of non-endorsement, but also on the basis
of non-interference. Moreover, the Court extended the notion of compulsion
or coercion beyond the use of criminal sanctions to include economic incentives
and psychological or social pressure. This broadened the scope of both the freedom
to and the freedom from religion to include policies that create economic incentives
not to engage in religious observance,48 as well as psychological pressure to
engage in official religious observance (at least in the Ontario Court of Appeal).49
However, the notion of non-endorsement extends conceptually beyond even the
broadest definition of coercive measures to an array of public policies that do
not include elements of coercion. It includes, for example, the adoption of an
official religion and its symbolic endorsement (e.g., the reading of the Lord’s
Prayer at sessions of the Legislative Assembly of Ontario). In addition, there are
policies that do not endorse a religion but that involve the intermingling of the
state with religious matters (e.g., funding for religious schools, delegating the
authority to marry to religious officials, or the enforcement of religious law).
These would likely run afoul of non-endorsement but not of non-interference so
long as religious institutions were not given a de jure or de facto monopoly over
areas of public policy. And while the Court has held that religious objectives for
legislation were impermissible per se under section 1,50 this is not a free-standing
constitutional doctrine of non-endorsement because it is only engaged when a
Charter right has been breached. It provides a basis for ruling out certain justifications of rights-limiting policies, not an independent basis for impugning the
constitutionality of government action.

47. The anti-establishment clause states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion … .” US Const Amends I.
48. Edwards Books, supra note 3.
49. Freitag v Penetanguishene (Town) (1999), 47 OR 3d 301, 179 DLR (4th) 150 (CA);
Zylberberg v Sudbury (Bd of Education) (1988), 65 OR (2d) 641, 52 DLR (4th) 577 (CA).
50. Big M, supra note 2.
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The Quebec cases raised a new issue for the Court under section 2(a):
reasonable accommodation. What the Quebec cases show is that the Quebec
judges on the Supreme Court resisted claims for reasonable accommodation by
articulating, defending, and developing the doctrine of non-endorsement under
the constitutional banner of the “neutral state.” This idea played out at several
stages of the constitutional analysis. In Amselem, the neutral state was used by the
dissenting judges (whose number included Justices LeBel and Deschamps) as the
basis for their refusal to incorporate the notion of reasonable accommodation into
article 9.1 of the Quebec Charter, the analog to section 1 of the Charter. Justice
LeBel’s dissent in Lafontaine, in which he mistakenly characterized the claim as
one for positive assistance to support religious practices, can also be explained on
the basis of the concern that accepting the constitutional claim would undermine
the neutrality of the state. In Bruker, the neutral state was at the heart of Justice
Deschamps’ forceful dissent, in which she refused to accept that an agreement to
grant a get (divorce) pursuant to Jewish law was justiciable in the ordinary courts.
In Multani, it may have been one of the unstated reasons for Justice Deschamps’
concurrence, which would have resolved the appeal on non-constitutional,
administrative law grounds as opposed to invoking the Charter. I now turn to
these cases.
C.

AMSELEM

Amselem was a private dispute, but one with important constitutional implications.
It arose from a disagreement between a group of Jewish condominium owners
and the condominium corporation over the formers’ erection of succahs on their
balconies, which are used in the observance of the religious festival of Succot.
The erection of these structures violated the building by-laws, which were facially
neutral but prohibited the use of balconies for this purpose. Because this was a
dispute between private parties in Quebec, the Quebec Charter—rather than the
Charter—governed the dispute. This was the first case in which the plurinational
dimension of a dispute was reflected in the split on the Supreme Court. The
majority judgment, penned by Justice Iacobucci, was joined by the other
anglophone judges (save Justice Binnie), while the principal dissent was written
by Justice Bastarache and joined by the two remaining francophone judges, Justices
LeBel and Deschamps.
In the lower courts, the case was framed as a claim for accommodation.51
The claimants argued that the by-laws infringed their right to engage in conduct
51. Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, [2002] RJQ 906, JQ no 705 (CA) [Amselem (CA)], aff’g
[1998] RJQ 1892, RDI 489 (CS civ).
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rooted in their religious beliefs. According to the claimants, this entitled them
to an accommodation in the form of an exemption from the operation of the
by-laws for the duration of Succot. Curiously, the language of reasonable
accommodation was not carried forward into the Supreme Court, but the gist
of the legal claim remained the same. Importantly, this was the first reasonable
accommodation case under freedom of religion to arise from Quebec. Moreover,
the case was understood by the entire Court to be of constitutional significance.
The majority and dissents, notwithstanding their deep disagreement, agreed on a
basic interpretive issue: Although the appeal was being decided under the Quebec
Charter, the interpretation of the freedom of religion under the Charter would
be identical.
The divergent approaches of the majority and principal dissent on the
limitation analysis bear careful examination. Section 9.1 of the Quebec Charter
provides that the rights guaranteed by the Charter are subject to limitations in
the name of “democratic values, public order and the general well-being of the
citizens of Québec.”52 There was an important and revealing difference in how
the majority and the principal dissent conceptualized the interpretation of section
9.1 and applied it to the case at hand. For the majority, the interpretation of
section 9.1, even in private disputes, was very similar to a standard section 1
analysis under the Charter. The majority therefore enumerated the countervailing rights of the other co-owners that were also protected by the Quebec
Charter—their rights to property and security—which in turn undergirded
three concerns about the erection of succahs: safety (succahs would obstruct fire
escapes), economic (succahs would lower the value of the property), and aesthetic
(succahs would disrupt the uniform external appearance of the building). The
majority then considered the importance of these interests. Since the majority
found that the safety and economic interests were real, the issue was the degree
to which they were impaired by accommodation. The majority considered the
impairment quite minimal. The conclusion was highly fact-specific, in a manner
typical of a section 1 analysis, involving a close examination of the limited
duration of the accommodation and its physical design (which minimized
safety and economic concerns). In short, the majority’s section 9.1 analysis was
in substance identical to a minimal impairment analysis under section 1, which
might have reached a different conclusion had one or more of these factual
details been different. Moreover, although the majority did not expressly invoke
the duty to accommodate, its analysis was materially the same.
52. Quebec Charter, supra note 22.
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The majority treated the purported aesthetic interest differently. In addition
to holding that the aesthetic impact of the succahs was minimal, the majority
went further and opined:
In a multiethnic and multicultural country such as ours, which accentuates and
advertises its modern record of respecting cultural diversity and human rights and
of promoting tolerance of religious and ethnic minorities — and is in many ways an
example thereof for other societies —, the argument of the respondent that nominal,
minimally intruded-upon aesthetic interests should outweigh the exercise of the
appellants’ religious freedom is unacceptable. Indeed, mutual tolerance is one of
the cornerstones of all democratic societies. Living in a community that attempts to
maximize human rights invariably requires openness to and recognition of the rights
of others. In this regard, I must point out, with respect, that labelling an individual’s
steadfast adherence to his or her religious beliefs “intransigence”, as Morin J.A.
asserted at para. 64 [in his judgment in the Quebec Court of Appeal], does not
further an enlightened resolution of the dispute before us.53

The majority doubted whether aesthetic interests were sufficiently important,
even in principle, to constitute a legitimate reason to restrict religious freedom.
But it also came very close to saying that the assertion of these interests was in
fact motivated by a rejection of the very idea of religious diversity, which is
an inadmissible reason to limit a guaranteed right under the Quebec Charter and
no doubt under the Charter as well. The majority’s strong rebuke to Justice Morin
for his criticism of the rights-claimants fits with this reading of its reasons.54
The principal dissent is a study in contrasts. Justice Bastarache took pains to
emphasize that the limitation analysis under section 9.1 “is clearly different from
the duty to accommodate.”55 By implication, this is how he characterized the
majority’s approach to section 9.1. Rather, Justice Bastarache proposed that the
appropriate framework is the “reconciliation of rights.”56 What turns on Justice
Bastarache’s distinction between accommodation and reconciliation? For Justice
Bastarache, a reasonable accommodation analysis entailed “a simple inquiry into
the relative importance of the infringement of the co-owners’ rights” and was “a
question of simply comparing the inconvenience for one party with the inconvenience for the other … .”57 So the reconciliation of rights must be a different
kind of exercise. How? On its very terms, the rights of others—in this case, other
co-owners—must count in the reconciliation of rights. But the rights of others
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Amselem, supra note 13 at para 87, referring to Amselem (CA), supra note 50.
Amselem, supra note 13.
Ibid at para 154.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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also count under the duty to accommodate. What is the additional element?
Justice Bastarache seems to suggest that it may consist of “the demands of social
existence,”58 “the public interest,”59 or more precisely, “the common interest of all
citizens of Quebec.”60
This suggests that there is a collective interest at stake in what the majority
characterized as a private dispute between property owners, which cannot be
reduced to the rights of the co-owners resisting the claim for reasonable
accommodation. But the principal dissent never quite states what this additional,
collective interest is. Towards the end of its reasons, however, the principal
dissent offered a clue when it said, “it should be noted that all the co-owners have
an interest in maintaining harmony in the co-owned property … .”61 What kind
of harmony is this? Why would it be jeopardized by the succahs? The principal
dissent is maddeningly vague.
There are three possible interpretations of harmony: aesthetic, legal, and
political. The aesthetic interpretation is that harmony means visual harmony. The
difficulty is that this is an interest protected by the rights of each objecting co-owner;
it is not a collective interest that goes above and beyond the individual owners. The
legal interpretation of harmony is that in the civil law tradition that underpins the
interpretation of the Quebec Charter, one must interpret rights to avoid any potential
conflict between them—that is, one must harmonize their meanings. This is a more
plausible reading of Justice Bastarache’s reasons, but again, it goes to the reconciliation of the competing rights of the co-owners and does not explain what the
collective interest in harmony is. The political interpretation is the most persuasive.
On this account, the crucial detail is that the balconies on which the succahs were
erected were part of the common portions of the building, although reserved for
the exclusive use of the owners of the condominiums to which they were attached.
The unstated collective interest at stake related to the character of these common
portions shared by individuals who disagreed on questions of faith. To engage in
religiously rooted conduct in these common portions could give rise to conflict,
because it would alter the character of those spaces in ways that did not accord with
the religious beliefs of others who had an equal legal right to those spaces. Moreover,
conflict on a piece of private property could fuel broader social conflict. To avoid
social conflict, those spaces should be free of religious conduct. They should be free
from religious identity; they should be neutral.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Ibid at para 151.
Ibid at para 154.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 172.

596

(2013) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

Thus, at the root of this reconstruction of the principal dissent in Amselem
is the idea that neutrality is a means for avoiding conflict and for maintaining
harmony in a religiously diverse community. This idea is applied in the context
of a private dispute. The doctrine of neutrality (or non-endorsement), however,
originated as a public law doctrine applicable to public institutions and property. It
arose during the Protestant Reformation as a tool for preventing political conflict
in religiously diverse political communities, where the basic question of constitutional design was what the official state religion should be. This gave rise to
horrible civil wars, and ultimately, the solution was to banish religion from public
institutions, establish a neutral state that had no official religious identity, and
make religious belief a private matter.
D.

LAFONTAINE

This theory of the religiously neutral state—implicit in the principal dissent in
Amselem—is set out explicitly in Justice LeBel’s dissenting reasons in Lafontaine,
which was handed down at the same time. The plurality dissent in Amselem
and Justice LeBel’s dissent in Lafontaine must be read together, although oddly
enough they do not cross-reference each other. Lafontaine concerned an attempt
by a congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses to build a place of worship. The
municipality’s zoning by-law designated a particular zone of the city for places of
worship, where the congregation was unable to purchase a parcel of land. Instead,
it purchased land zoned for commercial use and applied to the city to have the
property rezoned. The city denied the claim without reasons, and the congregation
challenged this refusal on both administrative law and Charter grounds.
The majority held that the municipality breached a common law duty of
fairness owed to the congregation and did not address the constitutional issues.
The dissenting judges,62 by contrast, dealt with the Charter argument. The
undisputed starting point of the claim was that section 2(a) protected the right
to build a place of worship, and it would be unconstitutional for the municipality
to create legal barriers that prevented a congregation from doing so. But, as the
dissent put it, this was not the issue before the Court because of key findings
of fact: Land zoned for places of worship was available for purchase and the
congregation had been unable or unwilling to purchase it. The issue, therefore,
62. Justices Bastarache and Deschamps, who joined the principal dissent in Amselem, concurred
with Justice LeBel’s dissent in Lafontaine. Justice Major wrote a separate dissent, concurring
with Justice LeBel’s conclusion that there was no violation of freedom of religion and that
the Court of Appeal could not review the trial judge’s finding of fact about the availability of
land zoned for places of worship.
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was whether section 2(a) imposed an obligation on a municipality to rezone land
for use as a place of worship in circumstances where land zoned for this use was
available for purchase. In the lower courts, this was framed as a claim for reasonable accommodation. In essence, the argument was that the refusal to rezone the
land was a breach of section 2(a) and that the minimally impairing alternative
was to rezone the particular parcel of land in question, while leaving the zoning
by-laws in place.
The dissenting judges’ rejection of the claim was anchored in a theory of
religious neutrality. According to Justice LeBel, the state’s duty of neutrality is the
product of a long-term process that involved the gradual separation of church and
state over a number of centuries as part of the secularization of public institutions.
The net result is a framework for religion-state relations, which “imposes on the
state and public authorities in relation to all religions and citizens, a duty of
religious neutrality … .”63 He insisted that “it is no longer the state’s place to
give active support to any one particular religion.”64 The role of the state, in his
view, “is limited to setting up a social and legal framework in which beliefs
are respected and members of the various denominations are able to associate
freely in order to exercise their freedom of worship,”65 such that “the practice
of religion and the choices it implies relate more to individuals’ private lives or
to voluntary associations.”66
On Justice LeBel’s account, the idea of the neutral state is the purpose
underlying and shaping the interpretation of section 2(a). On his argument, once
the state has set up a legal framework for freedom of religion, its job is done. It is
under no duty to ensure that religious communities are able to successfully pursue
their religious projects within that framework. One implication is that section
2(a) is a negative right, not—save in exceptional circumstances—a positive one.
Another, more subtle, implication is that the privatization of faith is bundled
with a libertarian approach to the distribution of material resources through markets.
The state owes no positive duty to redistribute material resources toward religious
groups even if those resources may be necessary to enable them to pursue their
religious projects.
For Justice LeBel, the fatal flaw of the constitutional claim was that it was a
positive request for the municipality’s assistance to rezone the land in the face of
the congregation’s inability to purchase land already zoned and available for that
63.
64.
65.
66.
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purpose. The unstated implication is that the principal barrier to this transaction
was financial and that rezoning would be a form of subsidy, presumably enabling
the congregation to purchase less expensive land and use it for religious purposes.
A right to positive assistance of this kind would contravene the duty of neutrality
and hence was beyond the scope of section 2(a).
In essence, the dissent attributed the congregation’s inability to purchase
land on which to construct a place of worship to private actors and markets, not
to the municipality. Markets and the decisions of private market actors operate in
an institutional space free from Charter scrutiny. Hence whatever hardship may
have resulted from that private sphere was beyond the concern of constitutional
law. The difficulty with this argument is that the scarcity of land zoned for places
of worship, which in turn determined the availability and price of that land, was
caused by the municipality’s policy decision, namely, the zoning by-law. Moreover,
the by-law operated as an impediment to land use, in the form of a legal duty not
to use the land for certain purposes. The congregation’s claim for an exemption
was therefore rooted in a negative right to build a place of worship on privately
owned land, which the zoning by-law interfered with.
Indeed, in many situations, what the duty to accommodate requires is an
exemption from a rule of general application—that is, for the state to refrain
from acting. This is particularly true for religious communities who wish to be
exempt from the application of duties. This was the case in Lafontaine. It was also
true in Amselem (exemption from the condominium by-laws). Thus, the duty to
accommodate is in fact often a negative, not a positive, right. The difficulty with
Justice LeBel’s reasons is further illustrated by a hypothetical situation. Imagine
that the municipality had decided not to zone any land for places of worship so
that private markets for such land did not exist. A congregation that purchased
private property zoned for commercial use could credibly argue that the municipality
was interfering with its negative right to build a place of worship without state
interference, and they could frame a section 2(a) claim on this basis. The difference
between this scenario and the one facing the Court in Lafontaine is one of
degree—not of kind.
As a result, the negative/positive rights distinction does not really explain
Justice LeBel’s dissent in Lafontaine. Here is another explanation: There is an
important ambiguity between two different conceptions of a positive obligation
arising from the duty to accommodate. In one sense, the duty is a positive right
in some circumstances because it requires the establishment of new programs,
the allocation of public funds for them, and the creation of new institutions to
deliver them. An example would be the provision of separate prenatal classes to
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women who object on religious grounds to the attendance of men. But there is a
second sense in which the duty to accommodate imposes positive obligations on
the state, irrespective of its legal form as a negative or positive right. Any claim for
accommodation by members of a religious minority implies that the state must
act to modify its norms, practices, and institutions from the status quo in support
of religious observance. If one regards religious observance strictly as a private
matter, which takes place within the framework of liberal rights alongside a strictly
neutral state that acts neither to impede nor to support religious conduct because
it is entirely indifferent to it, then on this view accommodation appears to cross
a line. Accommodations of religious conduct could be construed as some kind of
official approval or endorsement of the beliefs that underpin that conduct, which
then undercut a claim to state indifference. Acting to support a religious practice
could connote acting in the name of such practice by institutionalizing and
legitimizing it. On this view, accommodations threaten the very secular character
of the state. This is what may have concerned Justice LeBel. Because the majority
declined to rule on the constitutional question, it did not set out a counter-vision
to address the nature of the section 2(a) breach and, more fundamentally, Justice
LeBel’s theory of the neutral state.
E.

BRUKER

The case that provided a platform for these competing visions to come to the
fore was Bruker. The parties had been married under both civil law and Jewish
law. The marriage broke down and divorce proceedings were commenced, which
resulted in a legal divorce settlement. At issue was an agreement between the
parties to appear before a rabbinical court to obtain a Jewish divorce (a get). This
agreement constituted a clause in the divorce settlement, but the husband did
not comply. As a consequence, while the wife obtained a civil divorce, she was
still married under Jewish law. If she chose to re-marry, any children born to the
second marriage would have been illegitimate in the eyes of her faith.
The wife brought the action to seek damages for breach of the agreement.
The key question on which the Court sharply divided was the threshold question
of the justiciability of the agreement in the civil courts. The agreement created
an obligation on the parties to engage the institutional machinery and rules of
the Jewish legal system, and the point in dispute was whether these features of
the agreement rendered it unenforceable in the secular legal system. The differing
approaches of the majority and the dissent on this narrow point were anchored in
an underlying, deeper disagreement over the theory of the neutral state.
The majority judgment written by Justice Abella appears to have set out a
two-pronged test to address the issue. The first question asked whether the
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procedures surrounding the negotiation of the agreement, its form, and the
legal intent behind it were akin to those that characterize contracts in general.
This requirement was met, because the agreement had been negotiated by
adults, who were advised by legal counsel, “as part of a voluntary exchange of
commitments intended to have legally enforceable consequences.”67 The second
question was whether the agreement was nonetheless unenforceable because it
was against public order. For the majority, this was a context-specific question to
be addressed in each case. The overall question was whether the agreement was
“consistent with our laws, policies, and democratic values.”68 As illustrations, the
majority suggested that an agreement that violated custody or employment laws
would contravene public order and be unenforceable.
The Court’s understanding of public order is clearly in its infancy, but some
sense of the direction in which it may head can be gleaned from statements
made at the outset of the majority’s reasons. On one hand, the majority held that
Canadians have “[t]he right to have differences protected,”69 because of Canada’s
commitment to multiculturalism, which entails the “recognition that ethnic,
religious or cultural differences will be acknowledged and respected.”70 But there
are limits: “[T]he assertion of a right based on difference” must be “compatible
with Canada’s fundamental values,” and determination of such compatibility is
a “complex, nuanced, fact-specific exercise that defies bright-line application.”71
Although this framework was not set out under the Charter, it addresses the
same sorts of issues that would arise under a section 1 analysis. Moreover, its
case-dependent approach is identical to the assessment of the reasonableness of
claims for religious accommodation. There is therefore an interpretive continuity
between Bruker and the jurisprudence on reasonable accommodation, which
justifies treating them as an integrated whole even if the claim in Bruker was not
for reasonable accommodation per se under section 2(a).
Justice Deschamps dissented sharply on the theory of public order. She set
the tenor for her reasons at the outset, suggesting that it was “obvious that in the
twenty-first century”72 religious obligations did not provide a cause of action
cognizable to the civil legal system. She went on to ground her stance in the
theory of neutrality, the application of which she extended beyond the legislature
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and the executive—as set out in Lafontaine—to the courts. She appeared to offer
two reasons for developing the theory in this direction. First, in a religiously
diverse society, the judiciary must resolve legal disputes among adherents of
different faiths. Her concern seems to be that it would be difficult for the courts
to play this role if they were engulfed in resolving disputes based on “religious
precepts and undertakings.”73 Thus, just as the theory of neutrality protects the
state from being drawn into religious conflict by placing it above the fray, so too
does it protect the judiciary. Second, her concern is that by enforcing religious
rules, courts may legitimize them and reinforce their social meanings. The
difficulty is that these social meanings may contradict other fundamental values
in the constitutional order. In the case at hand, for example, Justice Deschamps
raised the concern that enforcing the obligation to give a get legitimizes the
corollary of failing to obtain a get—i.e., that children born to parents who have
not obtained a divorce under Jewish law are illegitimate. She asked rhetorically
whether enforcing such a rule would attach “opprobrium to a child born to
unmarried parents … .”74
Justice Deschamps’ reasons are at times emotional and reflect a deep anxiety
over the potential consequences of the majority ruling. She states that rendering
the agreement justiciable would undermine the “hard-won gains”75 of Canadian
society in the march toward neutrality. She asks whether the decision opens the
door to using the civil courts “to penalize … failure to pay the Islamic mahr, refusal
to raise children in a particular faith, refusal to wear the veil, failure to observe
religious holidays, etc.”76 What is even more striking about Justice Deschamps’
dissent is how she anchors the theory of state neutrality and its legal operation in
this case in a broader political narrative about the evolution of modern Quebec.
At the heart of her account of modern Quebec is the Quiet Revolution, which
she refers to twice in her reasons,77 and its stance on the relationship between
religion and state. This is a move of deep constitutional significance because, as
the debate over reasonable accommodation demonstrates, these issues have a
particular salience in Quebec, which Justice Deschamps seems to be acknowledging. Moreover, the Quiet Revolution was the beginning of modern Quebec
nationalism. To be clear, Justice Deschamps does refer to the neutrality of “the
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Canadian state”78 and Canada’s openness to all religions. By invoking the Quiet
Revolution, however, she may be suggesting that Quebec’s distinctive identity
ought to condition how the courts approach these issues in cases arising from
that province. Thus, while she suggests that the neutrality of the state is a concept
in both “Canadian and Quebec law,”79 she may be seeking to highlight that the
way these issues play out within the province is a function of legal principles rooted
in that province and, by implication, in its identity. By contrast, the majority
does not refer to the Quebec Revolution or the fact that issues of religion-state
relations have a particular salience in that province, thereby rejecting the idea that
the Quebec character of the case is legally important.
By way of conclusion, it is interesting to observe who did and did not concur
with Justice Deschamps’ dissent. Justice Charron (another francophone judge
albeit from outside Quebec), who was appointed to the Supreme Court after
Amselem and Lafontaine, signed onto her reasons while Justice LeBel joined the
majority judgment, leaving Justice Deschamps to restate, defend, and develop
the theory of the neutral state that he had espoused in Lafontaine. What prompted
Justice LeBel’s change of heart we may never know.
F.

MULTANI

I now turn to Multani, a highly controversial decision that provoked a public outcry
in Quebec and prompted the creation of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission. A
Sikh boy argued that he had a constitutional right to wear a ceremonial dagger,
a kirpan, underneath his clothing at school. The school board originally granted
him permission to do so, subject to conditions to ensure the kirpan was sealed
within his clothing and therefore did not pose a risk to his safety or the safety of
other students. The school’s governing board refused to approve this agreement
on the basis that it contravened a prohibition in the school’s code of conduct on
the carrying of weapons. The claimant appealed this decision administratively
and challenged the refusal to grant him permission on constitutional and
administrative law grounds.
A majority of the Supreme Court held that the wearing of a kirpan fell within
the scope of section 2(a), but legitimate safety concerns required that it be worn
subject to the conditions originally set by the school. According to the Court,
this was a reasonable accommodation. I want to draw attention to Justice
Deschamps’ concurrence, which would have resolved the issue on administrative
law grounds. Multani is one of a series of section 2(a) cases brought under both
78. Ibid at para 182.
79. Ibid at para 184.

CHOUDHRY, RIGHTS ADJUDICATION 603

the Charter and administrative law (the others are Trinity Western, Chamberlain,
and Lafontaine). The Court has yet to set out a satisfactory legal framework for
determining whether to resolve cases on the basis of administrative law or the
Charter, where a choice between the two is available. This question divided the
Court in Multani. The dissent drew a distinction between challenges to decisions
or orders on the one hand and norms of general application on the other, arguing
that the Charter is available only to challenge the constitutionality of the latter,
whereas for the former, only administrative law is available.
The dissent gave two justifications for this proposition. First, the text of
section 1 of the Charter refers to a “law,” and it therefore contemplates its use
only for challenges to norms of general application that either take the form of
a law or have a law-like structure. The negative implication is that the Charter
as a whole is not appropriate for reviewing individual administrative decisions
and orders. As the majority noted, the main difficulty with this argument is that
section 1 refers to limitations that are “prescribed by law,” a broad term that
encompasses norms as well as decisions or orders made pursuant to them. It also
contradicts a long and well-established line of precedents on Charter application,
which have held that the application of the Charter to law-making by legislative
bodies carries with it the implication that the Charter applies to bodies that act
pursuant to legal authorization. This principle has been applied in a number of
high profile Charter cases (e.g., Slaight Communications,80 Eldridge,81 Ross,82 and
Little Sisters83). If the individual decision lies beyond the scope of legal authorization, then this means that the section 1 defense fails at the outset because the
decision is not prescribed by law—it does not mean that the Charter is inapplicable
to such disputes. Indeed, this is how the Charter works in the criminal procedure
context (especially in section 8 cases).
Second, the dissent argued that the notion of reasonable accommodation
fits uncomfortably within the framework of section 1 and is better dealt with as
a matter of administrative law. The dissent’s reasoning is unclear, but it seems to
turn on a distinction between “microcosmic” and “macrocosmic” legal analysis.84
A microcosmic legal analysis focuses on the particular circumstances of individuals and private parties, whereas a macrocosmic analysis necessitates attention to
80. Slaight Communications Inc v Davidson, [1989] 1 SCR 1038, 59 DLR (4th) 416 [Slaight
Communications].
81. Eldridge, supra note 36.
82. Attis v New Brunswick School District No 15, [1996] 1 SCR 825, 133 DLR (4th) 1 [Ross].
83. Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada (Minister of Justice), 2000 SCC 69, 2 SCR
1120 [Little Sisters].
84. Multani, supra note 8 at para 132.
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“societal interests,”85 “social facts,”86 and “wider social implications,”87 thus placing
the individual against the state. It follows, the dissent reasoned, that “[t]hese
separate streams — public versus individual — should be kept distinct.”88 This
argument does not hold together. On the one hand, it has long been recognized
that administrative law cases have a macrocosmic character if they involve
challenges to the legality of policies, which may take the form of legal norms
through secondary legislation. Moreover, judicial review under administrative
law, by definition, involves challenges to the legality of government decisions,
even if the underlying dispute that gives rise to the administrative decision is
between private parties. In many cases, there is no private dimension at all, such
as in Multani. Conversely, there is nothing in the structure of section 1 that
precludes its application to individual decisions. To be sure, section 1 may require
calibration to deal with those situations, but the Court has never said that section 1 is
inapt for these circumstances.
The best justification for the dissent is found in the following paragraph:
The scope of the Canadian Charter is broad. Section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982
guarantees the supremacy of the Constitution of Canada. This incomparable tool
can be used to invalidate laws that infringe fundamental rights and are not justified
by societal goals of fundamental importance. However, where the concepts specific
to administrative law are sufficient to resolve a dispute, it is unnecessary to resort to
the Canadian Charter.89

The dissent is gesturing to the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. In legal systems
around the world, there is a general rule that counsels courts to resolve constitutional
challenges on non-constitutional grounds, if possible. The best-known example
is the general rule that statutes should be interpreted in a manner consistent with
constitutional rules, if the language permits. The principle behind the doctrine is
that the power of constitutional judicial review should only be used when absolutely
necessary, because it establishes hard constraints on legislative power and limits
subsequent political decision-making. Resolving cases on a non-constitutional basis
therefore preserves a space for ongoing democratic debate.90
The preference for administrative law over constitutional grounds of review
could be justified on the same basis. As Evan Fox-Decent puts it, “common-law
85.
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judicial review permits the legislature to have the last word through ordinary
democratic means.”91 Read alongside Justice Deschamps’ clear concerns about
claims for reasonable accommodation and how they may collide with public
order,92 this argument may be particularly salient in cases involving reasonable
accommodation. Like Multani, it preserves a space for a legislated response to
the question of reasonable accommodation of religious practices. The legislative
process provides a platform for the inclusion of a broader set of social interests—
such as the idea of the neutral state—in framing a comprehensive legislative
response to these claims across a variety of institutional contexts, from public
schools to universities, hospitals, and public sector workplaces. It also allows for
the legislature to set constraints on case-by-case decision making by the courts
in reasonable accommodation cases. Indeed, the pains Justice Deschamps took
to distinguish between reasonable accommodation and minimal impairment is
highly suggestive, because it implies that a legislated framework for resolving
these claims need not comply with the duty to accommodate precisely because of
the broader array of relevant interests at play.

III. CONCLUSION: SL AND OPEN SECULARISM?
When the Charter was adopted, the great conflict between a pan-Canadian bill of
rights and Quebec nationalism was expected to centre on questions of language. To
be sure, legislative efforts by the government of Quebec to establish French as the
common public language of economic, political, and social life, by regulating
the language of the marketplace and the education system, have been flashpoints
of constitutional conflict. But as the Charter enters its third decade, religion-state
relations have emerged as a new dimension of the politics of plurinationalism
in Canada, with a divide emerging between Quebec and the RoC on questions
of reasonable accommodation. This should not be surprising, since the Quiet
Revolution was about an integrated project of linguistic and secular nation building,
centred around the institutions of the Quebec state.
While Quebec’s language policies generated important cases under the
Charter soon after its adoption, issues of religion have only done so in the last
decade. Moreover, the approach of the Court in these two sets of cases is a study
91. Evan Fox-Decent, “The Charter and Administrative Law: Cross-Fertilization in Public Law”
in Colleen M Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in Context (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery, 2008) 169 at 181.
92. Bruker, supra note 9.
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in contrasts. On challenges involving Quebec’s language policies, the Court did
not divide on national lines. Rather, it spoke unanimously in its institutional
voice with no apparent split between francophone and anglophone justices. One
might argue that it worked to present a united front in order to protect its own
legitimacy as well as that of the Charter. Its jurisprudence on reasonable accommodation, centred in Quebec, is markedly different. Not only has the Court been
divided, but its francophone judges have penned separate concurrences or dissents
that map onto this cleavage, articulating theories of religion-state relations that
echo the discourses of political elites in Quebec. This division poses a risk to the
legitimacy of both the Charter and the Court itself against the backdrop of ongoing
political controversy in Quebec.
The Supreme Court may be attempting to reach a consensus on reasonable
accommodation across the Quebec-Canada divide out of an awareness of these
risks. The decision in which it did so is SL, yet another Quebec case, this
one concerning instruction on religion in public schools. For decades, public
education in Quebec was organized on the basis of language and religious
denomination. Through constitutional amendment, these arrangements were
finally abolished in 1995 and replaced with a system organized solely on the basis
of language. When schools were structured along religious lines, there was
mandatory instruction on religion and morals. This instruction was eventually
replaced with an Ethics and Religious Culture (ERC) Program that, on its
face, provides education about different religious traditions and ethics. Attendance
is mandatory.
In SL, Roman Catholic parents brought a constitutional challenge to the
ERC Program, arguing that compulsory attendance interfered with their section
2(a) rights to educate their children according to their religious values. In
particular, they argued that the program imparted cultural relativism and that,
as a consequence, they were entitled to reasonable accommodation in the form
of an exemption from mandatory attendance. The Court unanimously dismissed
the claim, with a majority judgment written by Justice Deschamps, holding that
the parents had not discharged their burden of proving that the program had
the effect of interfering with the parents’ ability to impart their religious values
to their children. She did not reach the constitutional issue. As Justice LeBel
pointed out in his concurrence, an evidentiary gap arose as a result of bringing
the case against the ERC Program in the abstract instead of against its implementation in schools, which had not yet occurred. According to Justice LeBel, only
then would it be possible to assess its potential impact on religious freedom. So,
the ERC Program may reappear before the Court.
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When it does, the challenge may come not only from religious parents
accusing the state of excessive secularism, but also from parents opposed to any
teaching about religion in the public educational system, who would accuse the
school of indirectly promoting religion by teaching students about it. This second
set of parents could argue—drawing on the theory of religious neutrality set out
by Justice LeBel in Lafontaine and Justice Deschamps in Bruker—that the public
education system is under a duty to remain above the religious fray and to refrain
from providing religious instruction at all, to protect the system from becoming
a site of inter-faith conflict and to protect the Court from legitimizing regressive
religious practices. Whereas the religious parents in SL claimed that the ERC Program
interfered with their freedom to religion, in a subsequent case a second set of parents
could counter that the program interfered with their freedom from religion.
This case would place the court in the crossfire between two competing
constitutional claims, both framed in terms of section 2(a). Justice Deschamps
appears to have anticipated this future dilemma and offered a response to
pre-empt it. She reframed the theory of religious neutrality she had championed in
Bruker, by rejecting “absolute neutrality”93 in favor of “a realistic and non-absolutist
approach” that “shows respect for all postures toward religion, including that of
having no religious beliefs whatsoever, while taking into account the competing
constitutional rights of the individuals affected.”94 This modified or softened
doctrine of neutrality was necessary both because “[t]he societal changes that
Canada has undergone since the middle of the last century have brought with
them a new social philosophy that favours the recognition of minority rights,”95
and because of “the multicultural reality of Canadian society.”96
This is a sharp departure from the theory of the neutral state set out by
Justice Bastarache in Amselem, Justice LeBel in Lafontaine, and Justice Deschamps
in Bruker. It remains unclear whether they would have resolved those earlier
cases differently on the basis of the new principle set out in SL. The opportunity
to clarify these issues may come soon. The Parti Quebecois has formed the
government in Quebec. Its election platform included a commitment to propose
a Charter of Secularism that would define Quebec as a secular state, presumably
in order to condition the interpretation of undue hardship and constrict the
scope of the duty to accommodate under the Quebec Charter. However, in what
way the courts would interpret such amendments, and what bearing they would
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have on the interpretation of the Charter, are entirely different questions. The
Court’s modified theory of neutrality suggests that these legislative initiatives may
face constitutional difficulties. SL may have been an effort by the Court to forge
a unified position ahead of the constitutional battles to come.

